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NOTE
HARRIs V. NEW YORK: THE RETREAT FROM MIRANDA
Petitioner, arrested and charged with selling heroin, vol-
untarily' answered questions of the police without having first
been warned of his right to counsel required by Miranda v.
Arizona.2 At trial, petitioner, on direct examination, gave an
account of the sales which differed from the account given the
police in his original statements.8 Over objection of defense
counsel, the prosecution was permitted to use the prior state-
ments in cross-examining the petitioner.4 The trial judge in-
structed the jury that the statements attributed to petitioner
by the prosecution could be considered only in deciding peti-
tioner's credibility and not as evidence of guilt. Petitioner was
found guilty, and his conviction was affirmed by the New York
appellate courts.5 On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that trustworthy, voluntary prior in-
consistent statements of a defendant, even though inadmissible
in the prosecution's case in chief because they are violative of
Miranda v. Arizona, may nonetheless be used on cross-exami-
nation to attack the credibilty of defendant's direct testimony.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Generally, evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights cannot be admitted against him at trial to
obtain his conviction." In 1954 the Supreme Court in Walder v.
1. Petitioner made no claim that the statements made to the police
were coerced or Involuntary.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. On direct examination petitioner denied making a sale on January 4.
He admitted selling the contents of a glassine bag to the undercover officer
on January 6, but claimed that the bag contained baking powder. The
appeals court summarized his statements to the police as follows: "[0]n
January 4, 1966 defendant acted as the undercover police officer's agent in
obtaining narcotics and . . . on January 6, 1966 defendant obtained narcotics
from an unknown person outside a bar and then sold the drugs to the
undercover agent in a bar." People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, -
298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247, aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1969).
4. Petitioner replied that he could remember virtually none of the
questions or answers recited to him by the prosecution from his original
statements.
5. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, aff'd, 25
N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sixth
amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Weeks
doctrine applied to states); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due
process requirements of fourteenth amendment); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (information obtained was through
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United States7 provided a narrow exception to the rule by hold-
ing that illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach the
credibility of a defendant at a later unrelated proceeding where
on direct examination "[t]he defendant went beyond a mere
denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and
made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed
any narcotics."8
an unconstitutional search and seizure); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914) (fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and
seizure).
7. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder the defendant took the stand during
his trial for illicit transactions In narcotics and testified on direct examina-
tion that he had never dealt in narcotics. The goverment then Introduced
testimony that, nearly two years previously, the police had seized narcotics
from the defendant, which evidence had been suppressed at a prior trial
because It was obtained during an unconstitutional search of defendant's
home. The Court distinguished Walder from Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925), by emphasizing that In the present case the defendant on
direct examination "made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in
or possessed any narcotics." Id. at 65. However, In Agnello, the govern-
ment, after failing to introduce the tainted evidence in Its case in chief,
tried to bring it In on cross-examination by asking the defendant the
broad question of whether or not he had ever seen narcotics before.
8. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). Justice Frankfurter
stated, however: "Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the
fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free
to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to Introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally
secured by it, and therefore not available for Its case in chief." Id. Although
the Court in Walder outlined a very narrow exception, lower federal courts
expanded the exception to include evidence directly related to the crime
In question, though not to the ultimate question of guilt. See United States
v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966): Defendant
was charged with bank robbery and conspiracy. Defendant had made two
statements to the police while being Illegally detained In violation of
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and without advice
of counsel. Both on direct and on cross examination, defendant denied
wearing a moustache on the day of the crime. To Impeach the defendant's
credibility an FBI agent was allowed to testify that during Illegal deten-
tion the defendant had admitted wearing a moustache. The court held It
was proper for the district court to permit use of the suppressed state-
ment for Impeachment "to establish facts collateral to the ultimate Issue
of guilt." Id. at 910. In Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
defendant, accused of theft of equipment from a hospital, testified he did
not know the man charged with having been his accomplice In the theft
and that he had gone to the hospital only to visit a friend. The court
held that defendant's confession obtained In violation of Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could be used to rebut his testimony,
stating that "[tlhe accused Is still free to take the stand and truthfully
deny all elements of the crime." Id. at 381. See also Bailey v. United States,
328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972 (1964); Lockley v. United
States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion of Judge Burger).
But see Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966); White v. United
States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Further, the rationale of Walder was applied to permit, for impeach-
ment purposes, the use of confessions obtained In violation of the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel. United States v. Mancusi, 272 F.
Supp. 261 (W.D. N.Y. 1967). See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d
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Although the Court in Miranda v. Arizona5 did not expressly
bar, for impeachment purposes, the use of evidence gained in
violation of the procedural guidelines it laid down, the Court
said in dictum,
"[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These
statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of
the word and may not be used without the full warnings
and effective waiver required for any other statement."'10
In light of this language and the general tenor of Miranda, the
majority of federal and state courts which dealt with the issue
held that statements inadmissible for the prosecution's case in
chief, because of failure to follow Miranda safeguards, were
also inadmissible for impeachment purposes.1 '
In the instant case the Supreme Court, although noting the
broad language of Miranda, concluded that Miranda was limited
to excluding uncounseled statements only from the prosecu-
tion's case in chief. The Court, recognizing that Walder con-
cerned impeachment only of matters other than elements of
the present crime, felt that there was no difference in principle
to warrant a different result where the alleged contradiction
concerned elements of the present crime. The majority noted
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d
163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); and the McNabb-Mallory rule, discussed in United
States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966);
Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972
(1964); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Rsv. 938, 1030 (1966); Comment,
622 Nw. U.L. REv. 912 (1968).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. at 477.
11. Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States
v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394
F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967); Velarde v.
People, 171 Colo. 261, 466 P.2d 919 (1970), overruled by Jorgenson v. People,
842 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1971), because of the Harris decision; State v. Galasso,
217 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1968); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d
209 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis.2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967). See also
Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 579, 630 (1968); Note, 19 S.C. L. REv. 281 (1967); Contra, State
v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Grant, 77 Wash. 2d 47, 459
P.2d 639 (1969).
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further that the speculative possibility of police misconduct 1'2
should not outweigh the value of the impeachment process in
aiding the jury to determine the defendant's credibility. Finally,
the Court stated that Miranda should not be perverted into a
license to use perjury as a defense, free from the risk of con-
frontation with prior inconsistent utterances. In a vigorous dis-
sent criticizing the majority's interpretation of Walder' and
Miranda,14 Justice Brennan argued that the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated.'5
He further contended the decision would seriously undermine
Miranda's deterrent effect on police misconduct.
Surely Harris will promote truthfulness by the defendant
who takes the witness stand. It is submitted, however, that this
worthwhile effect is outweighed by unfortunate results which
may arise out of the application of the Harris rule. Whereas
the underlying purpose of Miranda appears to have been to
place all citizens on an equal footing with respect to knowledge
of their constitutional rights16 and to promote government
12. The Court felt that police are sufficiently deterred when the evidence
seized illegally is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.
13. Justice Brennan emphasized the fact that Walder concerned im-
peachment of matters unrelated to the present crime. See note 7 supra.
14. "[Tlhe accused is denied an 'unfettered' choice when the decision
whether to take the stand is burdened by the risk that an illegally obtained
prior statement may be introduced to impeach his direct testimony denying
complicity in the crime charged against him. We settled this proposition
in Miranda where we said:
'The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner. . . . [SItate-
ments merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial. . . . These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement.'
[Emphasis added by Justice Brennan.] This language completely disposes
of any distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to cross-
examination. 'An incriminating statement is as incriminating when used to
impeach credibility as it is when used as direct proof of guilt and no
constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn.'" Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
15. "While Walder did not identify the constitutional specifics which
guarantee 'a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation
against him .. . [and permit him to] be free to deny all the elements of
the case against him,' in my view Miranda v. Arizona, identified the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination as one of those specifics."
Id. at 647.
16. "We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime con-
tains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individ-
ual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not other-
wise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full
1972]
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respect for the dignity of its citizens, 7 this purpose may be
undercut by Harris because police are now given an incentive
to withhold Miranda warnings.' Although it is generally agreed
that there is value in the defendant's testifying in his own
behalf,'9 Harris will probably reduce the number of defendants
taking the stand. Furthermore, courts have long been concerned
with the jury's capacity to comply with limiting instructions.20
Although the judge, as in Harris, may instruct the jury that
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused
must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise
of those rights must be fully honored." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966).
17. "All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitu-
tional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-
state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the government
'to shoulder the entire load,' . .. to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedi-
ent of compelling It from his own mouth .... In sum, the privilege Is fulfilled
only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak In the unfettered exercise of his own will.'" Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
18. Groshart v. United States, 391 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1968): "Surely,
too, we should not encourage law enforcement officials to interrogate one
in violation of his constitutional rights with the sole purpose of obtaining
evidence for use in impeaching him should he testify at a future trial or
for the purpose of thereby preventing a defendant from taking the stand
in his own defense. Impeachment is often an extremely significant factor
in close cases." State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 245, 422 P.2d 581, 583, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 948 (1967): "If we should today adopt a restrictive applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule, the result could be a major step backward.
This court would in effect be saying to the overzealous that police officers
will be free in the future to interrogate suspects secretly, at arms length,
without counsel, and without advice, so long as they use means consistent
with threat-or-promise voluntariness, and so long as they understand that
they may file the information only for use to keep the defendant honest.
Thus, the police could, at their option, take a calculated risk: By giving
up the possibility of using the suspect's statements in the state's case,
they could obtain by unconstitutional means and store away evidence to
use if the defendant should elect upon trial to take the stand. As com-
mendable as it may be to prevent perjury, the price of such prevention
could be to keep defendants off the stand entirely. In some cases, the
temptation to silence a suspect of dubious probity might very well out-
weigh the desire to conduct a constitutionally valid Interrogation. We have
concluded that to introduce such a rule could undo much of the recent
progress that has been made In upgrading police methods to preserve the
rights guaranteed under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and would be
Inconsistent with the trend of our recent decisions."
19. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
20. "[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not,
or cannot, follow instructions Is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitation of the
jury system cannot be Ignored." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135
(1968). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); C. McCoRMIcK,
Evmnzcu § 39, at 77 (1954).
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the prior inconsistent statements are to be used only for im-
peachment purposes, there is great temptation on the part of
the jury to consider the statements as indicative of guilt.
Harris also leaves some important questions unanswered.
First, the Court did not specifically limit its decision to impeach-
ment of the defendant's direct testimony. It appears, then, that
even though a defendant has made no inconsistent statement
on direct examination, the Harris rule may allow the prosecu-
tion to lead the defendant into an inconsistency on cross-
examination. This result depends, of course, upon the scope of
cross-examination in the particular jurisdiction.2 1 Secondly,
Harris apparently applies even where the police have inten-
tionally withheld Miranda warnings.22 However, the courts may
limit the applicability of the rule to cases where the police
inadvertently fail to inform the defendant of his constitutional
rights. Thirdly, the rule of Harris is by its terms limited to
statements which are both trustworthy and not "coerced and
involuntary. '2 The question remains, however, as to the rule
applicable where the statements are obtained unfairly in viola-
tion of Rogers v. Richmond.24 Since Harris does not include the
21. See The Work of the Louisiana Appelate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 345-46 (1972); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925). In Agnello the government, after having failed in its
efforts to introduce the tainted evidence in its case in chief, tried to
introduce it on cross-examination by asking the accused the broad ques-
tion of whether he had ever seen narcotics before. After eliciting the
expected denial, it sought to introduce evidence of narcotics located in
the defendant's home by means of an unlawful search and seizure, in order
to discredit the defendant. In holding that the government could no more
work in this evidence on cross-examination than it could in its case in
chief, the Court said, "[aind the contention that the evidence of the search
and seizure was admissible in rebuttal is without merit. In his direct
examination, Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the
can of cocaine. In cross-examination, in answer to a question permitted
over his objection, he said he had never seen it. He did nothing to waive
his constitutional protection or to justify cross-examination In respect of
the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search." Id. at 35.
22. In Harris the police evidently did not intentionally withhold the
Miranda caution. However, the court makes no distinction between situa-
tions in which the caution is intentionally withheld and those in which
it is inadvertently withheld.
23. 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
24. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Where the police obtained a confession from
the defendant after leading him to believe his wife was to be taken into
custody, the Supreme Court abandoned truthfulness as a permissible
standard under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
adopted the rule that the confession must be obtained so as not "to over-
bear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely deter-
mined." Id. at 544.
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Rogers prohibition, apparently unfairly obtained statements will
be admitted to attack the defendant's credibility.
Finally, the question arises concerning the exclusionary
rules to which the Harris decision applies. Although Harris
concerns a violation of Miranda, it has already been extended
to include a violation of Gideon v. Wainwright.25 Since the Court
in Harris relied upon Walder, presumably evidence obtained
pursuant to an illegal search and seizure can now be used to
discredit the defendant's testimony even though the evidence is
directly related to the elements of the present crime. In light
of the broad language of Harris,26 then, it is possible that its
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), where
the prosecution sought to introduce proof of prior convictions under the
Texas recidivist statute, the Supreme Court held that where, in violation
of Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 335 (1963), the defendant was not
afforded the right to counsel at the previous trials, the prior convictions
cannot be used to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense.
Yet in United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971),
the court held that where the defendant testified on direct examination
that he had never been convicted of crime, allowing the prosecutor on cross-
examination to elicit from the defendant the fact that he had previously
been convicted, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial even though
the convictions for the prior offenses were invalid for want of legal repre-
sentation. The court in justifying its decision said: "Harris [involved] a
violation of Miranda whereas here it was a violation of Gideon. The prin-
ciple is the same in either event. If a defendant testifies, he puts his
credibility in issue. If he lies in the course of his testimony, he lays
himself open to attack by means of illegal evidence which otherwise the
prosecution could not use against him." Id. at 170. But see Howard v.
Craven, 446 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court held it was error to
use a felony conviction obtained without counsel to impeach petitioner
at his felony trial, where the principal issue at trial was the credibility of
petitioner's story as compared to that of the complainant. The court held
Harris not applicable and distinguished Follette. "We reject the suggestion
that Harris v. New York . . . is applicable here. One obvious difference
between Harris and this case, Burgett, and Tucker is that the danger of
unrealiability of a defendant's statements is not necessarily great merely
because Miranda has been violated . . . but there is a clear danger of
convicting the innocent when the accused is denied the assistance of counsel
at trial. ... A second difference is that in Harris the illegal evidence
was admitted to rebut a specific false statement made by defendant while
testifying . . . here it was offered only for its general tendency to dis-
credit appellant's character. This difference also distinguishes United
States ex rel. Walker v. Follette . . . in which proof of prior convictions
obtained without the assistance of counsel was held to be admissible to
rebut defendant's false testimony that he had never been convicted of a
crime." rd. at 587. See also Untied States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1971).
26. "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense,
or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the
right to commit perjury.... Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner
was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the
prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process." 91 S. Ct. 643, 45-46 (1971).
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holding may be extended to include evidence obtained in viola-
tion of any exclusionary rule.
Although some states have apparently felt required to adopt
the rule of Harris,-7 that decision merely recognizes that states
may constitutionally receive such evidence for impeachment
purposes. It does not require that result. It is hoped that states
will continue to exclude evidence for impeachment purposes
where the evidence is seized in violation of an exclusionary
rule and is directly related to the matter of guilt.
William Craig Henry
27. See State v. Dixon, 15 Ariz. App. 62, 485 P.2d 1179 (1971); Rooks v.
State, 466 S.W.2d 478 (Ark. 1971); Jorgenson v. People, 482 P.2d 962 (Colo.
1971); Davis v. State, 271 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1971); People v. Calhoun, 33
Mich. App. 141, 189 N.W.2d 743 (1971); Small v. State, 466 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971); Morales v. State, 466 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971);
Riddell v. Rhay, 79 Wash.2d 248, 484 P.2d 907 (1971); Taylor v. State, 52
Wls.2d 453, 190 N.W.2d 208 (1971); Ameen v. State, 51 Wis.2d 175, 186
NW.W2d 206 (1971).
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